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1. Introduction
There’s a soldier in all of us.
Call of Duty: Black Ops TV Commercial (2010)
The visual and audio effects […] make the [war]
experience appear real. 
In fact the experience is sterile. We are safe. […] 
It takes the experience of fear and the chaos of
battle,
the defeating and disturbing noise, to wake us up,
to make us realize
that we are not who we imagined we were, that
war as displayed
by the entertainment industry might, in most
cases, as well be ballet.
Chris Hedges, War is a Force that Gives us Meaning
(2002)
Dear Ron McLean. Dear Coach’s Corner, 
I’m writing in order for someone to explain to my
niece […]
the function the ritual serves in conjunction with
what everybody knows 
is, in the end, a kid’s game.
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Propagandhi, lyrics from “Dear Coach’s Corner,”
Supporting Caste (2009)
1 January 1, 2010, was a special day in Boston. The Boston Bruins were about to face the
Philadelphia Flyers at Fenway Park, in the third hockey “Winter Classic,” an annual event
held by the National  Hockey League where two teams play an outdoor game.  “It’s  a
perfect day for hockey in Boston,” said Hockey Hall of Famer Bobby Orr as he watched the
game. “It’s a thrill to see all these pros turn into kids again. […] This day […] truly is a
classic” (quoted in Shaughnessy 2010).
2 The Bruins finally won the “Winter Classic” 2-1, but the event also produced other (less
noticeable) winners: those who favour a strong U.S. military and who support the wars
the United States and its allies wage abroad. Indeed, like many sports events taking place
in the United States, the “Winter Classic” instantly became a pretext for the glorification
of  the U.S.  war machine.  The crowd assembled at  Fenway offered one of  its  loudest
ovations when the ceremonial opening puck drop was made by a member of the U.S.
military. In addition, members of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast
Guard joined music artist James Taylor in singing the National Anthem. Then “a United
States Air Force B-2 Spirit flown by the 509th Bomb Wing of Whiteman Air Force Base in
Missouri and the 131st Bomb Wing of the Missouri Air National Guard soared overhead”
(Morreale 2010). Most people flashed their cameras and cheered when the B-2 flew over
Fenway’s Green Monster, but nobody seemed particularly surprised (or outraged) to see
that hockey – or what Canadian rock band Propagandhi calls a “kid’s game” – was being
used as a vehicle for militarist promotion/propaganda – right before their eyes! 
3 In fact, hockey is not the only popular culture artefact that has been a vehicle for the
militarization of post-9/11 everyday life. For instance, it could be argued that Hollywood
war movies such as Irwin Winkler’s Home of the Brave (2006) and Sidney J. Furie’s The Four
Horsemen (2008) have included messages condoning militarism1 and ideas analogous to
those of the George W. Bush administration (for example, the idea that Americans should
give their unconditional support to U.S. troops or the argument that the United States
must wage wars to fight “evil” enemies and protect democracy in the world)2. The goal of
this  article is  to discuss how digital  war games3 have played a similar role.  Building
bridges  between  the  humanities  approach  to  Game  Studies  4,  American  Studies,
International Relations and Critical Geopolitics, it starts from the assumption that digital
games are more than “kid’s games” or “lowbrow irrelevant child’s play” (Souri 2007, 537);
they  are  “sophisticated  vehicles  inhabiting  and  disseminating”  specific  ideologies
(Leonard 2004, 2). Accordingly, it uses the example of the Call of Duty series to highlight
how digital  war games contain images and narratives that elicit  consent for the U.S.
military, militarism and the wars the U.S. and its allies wage abroad. Call of Duty is a first-
person  and  third-person  shooter  series  franchise  that  began  on  the  PC  and  later
expanded  to  consoles  such  as  Playstation  3  and  XBOX  360.  Published  and  owned  by
Activision and developed by companies such as Infinity Ward and Treyarch, the majority of
the games in the main series (Call of Duty, Call of Duty 2, Call of Duty 3, Call of Duty: World at
War and Call of Duty: Black Ops) have been set primarily in World War II or the Cold War,
except for Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare and Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2, which are set in
modern times. While the first four games are relevant to a discussion of digital games and
militarism, since they embrace an overwhelmingly positive view of the U.S. military along
with a “patriotic willingness to support [U.S.] foreign ventures” and to portray World War
II as a “good war” (Boggs and Pollard 2007, 53), this article focuses on how Call of Duty
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constructs  images  about  the  future  of  international  relations,  the  threats  the  United
States faces in the post-9/11 world and the role Washington should play in this context.
Therefore, our references in this article will be to Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare and Call of
Duty: Modern Warfare 2.
4 The methodology of the article builds on Vit Sisler’s contribution to the content analysis
of  digital  games.  Thus,  we  “play[ed]  the  whole  game[s]  while  taking  notes  and
screenshots  of  relevant  visual  signifiers,  recording  the  narrative  and  analyzing  the
structure of gameplay” via qualitative description (Sisler 2008, 206). Building on Luiza
Bialasiewicz et al.,  we hope to generate a deeper understanding of the (pre)dominant
discourses about U.S. identity, Americans’ views about their soldiers, the military, and the
role the United States should play in the world by identifying the “citational practices
that are reiterated in [these] cultural and political sites outside the formal institutions of
the state” (Bialasiewicz et al.  2007, 409). In line with this methodology, Call  of Duty is
studied as a discourse: we look at the characters, plot and setting of the games and see
those  elements  as  a  “specific  series  of  representations  and  practices  through  which
meanings are produced, identities are constituted, […] and political and ethical outcomes
made more or less possible” (ibid. 406).  While the first section of the article offers a
review of some of the relevant literature on digital war games and U.S. militarism, the
second part turns to the content analysis of Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare and Call of Duty:
Modern Warfare 2. Specifically, this analysis focuses on three themes to highlight the ways
in  which  Call  of  Duty  (re)writes  U.S.  militarism  and  illustrates  that  these  games  (1)
resonate  with  and  reinforce  a  tabloid  imaginary  of  post-9/11  geopolitics;  (2)  glorify
military power and elicit consent for the idea that state violence and wars are inevitable;
and (3) encourage our myopia by depicting a sanitized vision of war and by downplaying
the negative consequences of state violence.
 
2. The Politics of Militarism in Digital Games
5 Since  9/11,  an  increasing  number  of  authors  have  studied  the  links  between  U.S.
militarism and digital  games.  For  example,  in  a  book called  Joystick  Soldiers,  Nina  B.
Huntemann and Matthew Thomas Payne have assembled various contributions on the
history of the links between militarism and military-themed games, the representation of
war in video games, the use of video games for training military personnel, the effects of
military-themed games on those who play them, and the acts of anti-war resistance that
can be performed in and through war games (Huntemann and Payne 2010). Particularly
relevant  to  our  discussion  is  David  Nieborg’s  contribution,  which  investigates  how
America’s  Army,  a  series  of  video games developed by the U.S.  Army,  is  used for  the
dissemination  of  “state-produced  propaganda  as  a  part  of  a  wider  U.S.  strategic
communication campaign” (Nieborg 2010, 54). Nieborg explains that, with its narrative
justifying  U.S.  military  interventions  abroad  and  propagating  the  U.S.  army  ethos,
America’s Army can be seen as a “powerful vessel for disseminating U.S. Army ideology
and foreign policy to a global game culture” (ibid. 63).
6 Other authors have used the case of America’s Army to make similar arguments about the
links between militarism and digital games. For instance, David Leonard explains that the
games in this series “exist as virtual advertisements for the present and future glory of
the U.S. Armed Forces” (Leonard 2004, 5); Marcus Power shows how the series “puts a
hospitable face on the military, manufacturing consent and complicity among consumers
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for military programmes, missions and weapons” (Power 2007, 278); Roger Stahl notes
that the game has been one of “the most successful experiments in recruiting history”
(Stahl 2006, 123); Johan Höglund argues that it portrays the Middle East as “a frontier
zone where a perpetual war between U.S.  interests and Islamic terrorism is enacted”
(Höglund 2008); Alexander Galloway describes it as “a bold and brutal reinforcement of
current American society and its positive moral perspective on military intervention”
(Galloway 2004); and Ian Bogost argues that it “supports a moral code that corresponds
with the U.S. Army’s focus on duty and honor” (Bogost 2007).
7 Those who study America’s Army (or other war games such as Kuma\War,  The Medal of
Honour or Full Spectrum Warrior) often rely on James Der Derian’s concept of the “military–
industrial–media–entertainment  network”  (MIME-NET)  to  highlight  the  relationship
between the U.S. military and government and the videogame industry. According to Der
Derian, this relationship has reached symbiotic proportions: U.S. Marines have trained on
Doom, a landmark 1993 first-person shooter game; “military war games and computer
video games blend” (Der Derian 2001, xi); and members of the U.S. military are consulted
on the production of digital games. Jean Baudrillard’s and Paul Virilio’s contributions are
also popular among scholars who study the links between digital games and war.5 For
Baudrillard, postmodernity means a blending of reality and representation (Baudrillard
1994); for Virilio, major powers such as the United States have developed powerful tools
for aiming militaristic propaganda at the civilian population.  In Virilio’s  words,  “The
central  electronic-warfare  administration  —  such  as  the  so-called  ‘3Ci’  (control,
command, communication, intelligence) in place in each major power — can now attend
in real time to the images and data of a planetary conflict […], tak[ing] charge of all
tactical and strategic representations of warfare for the soldier, the tank or aircraft pilot
[and the civilian population]” (Virilio  2000,  1-2).  Ian Bogost’s  concept  of  “procedural
rhetoric” can also be of great interest for scholars who study how digital games
contribute to the militarization of everyday life (Bogost 2007). Bogost defines it as the “
practice of using processes persuasively, just as verbal rhetoric is the practice of using
oratory persuasively and visual rhetoric is the practice of using images persuasively.”
(Ibid., 28) Using multiple examples such as the 1982 digital game Tax Avoiders, in which
the player’s goal is to become a millionaire by accumulating income and avoiding taxes,
Bogost shows how digital games are programmed in specific ways that “force the player
to make decisions with social and political implications” (Ibid., 45).
8 The fact that Call of Duty was not directly developed by the U.S. Army probably explains
why it has received less attention from scholars than games like America’s Army6. Yet the
desire of the designers of the game to recreate realistic troops, scenarios, tactics and
weapons  is  crucial  to  our  discussion.  As  Matthew  Thompson  explains,  digital
contemporary  war  games  have  become  more  and  more  “realistic”  and  “authentic”
(Thompson 2008,  23).  Since most gamers know that the digital  game industry is now
capable  of  producing  games  that  make  one  “feel”  (almost)  like  a  “real”  soldier,  the
realism and  authenticity  of  digital  war  games  have  become  vital  to  their  economic
success. Call of Duty project leader Jason West seems particularly aware of this when he
notes the following in an interview about Call of Duty 4: “My favourite vehicle in Call of
Duty 4 […] is the AC-130 Spectre Gunship because, I mean, when you see those web videos,
it looks just like that. I mean, you are in the Gunship… you know… using the cannons…
annihilating  anything  in  your  path”  (West  2007).  Furthermore,  when asked how the
developers  ensured that  Call  of  Duty  4  would be  authentic,  West’s  answer  shows  the
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relevance of Der Derian’s argument about the “blending” of U.S. military personnel and
digital  game programmers.  Indeed,  West  noted that  the creators of  Call  of  Duty have
“talked to soldiers that have come back from war,” discussed with “military advisors,”
“went to military bases,” and “stood there while they fired tanks.” To use West’s words,
the goal of those who made Call of Duty was to “put those things into the game” and to
“put the player there” (ibid.). Of course, these quotes do not prove beyond doubt that
West and his team had the deliberate intention of disseminating militarist propaganda.
However, our point is that their fascination with the U.S. military and arsenal, combined
with their willingness to emulate “real” environments and characters, prompted them to
produce  a  series  that  contributes  to  the  (re)writing  of  militarism  and  the  U.S.  war
machine. 
9 Our  definition  of  the  “(re)writing”  concept  comes  from the  disciplines  of  American
Studies and International  Relations:  it  builds on David Campbell’s  and Lene Hansen’s
contributions and is based on the assumption that the accepted way of speaking about an
event, an object and identities is “not fixed by nature, given by God” (Campbell 1998, 9)
but, instead, is “constructed through discourse” (Hansen 2006, 6). In other words, “there
are no objective identities [or definitions of the objects that surround us] located in some
extra-discursive realm” (ibid.); individuals of a given society help to ascribe particular
meanings to words like “soldiers,” “threat” and “war.”
10 That being said, in a diverse society like the United States, there are many concurrent
interpretations of these words. In line with this argument, the U.S. society can be seen as
a “marketplace of  ideas” (Abelson 2006)  where concurrent social  and political  actors
compete to ascribe particular meanings to identities, objects and events. To exemplify
this, Frank Costigliola reminds us that an event such as the bombing of a factory can be
described in many ways. For example, one reporter could say that the “missile struck the
target in a clean hit,” while another could say that “the ceiling of the factory burst open,
and most of the people working there burned to death in the ensuing blaze” (Costigliola
2004,  279).  According to Michel  Foucault,  power struggles in a given society and the
power to assign meaning to such events are inextricable. In Discipline and Punish, he writes
that “truth” is not outside power and that powerful individuals within a society are often
able to impose their discourse as the accepted way of interpreting or speaking about an
event or an object (Foucault 1975, 36). Foucault sees discourses as unquestioned beliefs,
practices, and rules that restrict how people think and act.7 David Campbell adds to the
theory, claiming that a good way for individuals to contribute to the emergence of a
(pre)dominant discourse is to repeat this discourse constantly so it becomes perceived as
conventional wisdom/common sense by the majority. Following Judith Butler’s analysis
of gender and identity (Butler 1990), Campbell argues that identities and meanings are
“instituted” through  a  “stylized  repetition  of  acts”  and  a  “regulated  process  of
repetition” (Campbell 1998, 9-10).
11 Drawing on such theoretical considerations, we argue that the creators of Call of Duty are
directly involved in the stylized process of repetition described by Butler and Campbell.
Indeed,  Call  of  Duty constantly echoes ideas similar to those of various foreign policy
hawks who have supported George W. Bush’s response to the terrorist attacks of New
York and Washington, thereby (re)producing a mindset that has often pervaded the U.S.
national security debate since 9/11.  For instance,  it  invites gamers and Americans to
conceive war and the preparation of war as the chief instruments of foreign policy and it
feeds  what  some  call  an  “addiction  to  war”  (Andreas  2004)  by  “cherishing”  and
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“fetishizing” the “ethos of armed power” (Boggs and Pollard 2007, 13). Moreover, the fact
that Call of Duty is one of the most popular war games is not without significance here: it
shows that the messages embedded in the series have reached millions of people. Many
analysts believe that the digital game industry may eclipse Hollywood for dominance in
the entertainment sector within five or ten years (Newsweek,  date unknown), and the
commercial success of Call of Duty suggests that their prediction might come true. For
instance, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 grossed $310 million within 24 hours of going on
sale in the U.S., U.K. and Australia, making it the biggest money maker in entertainment
history, ahead of other games such as Grand Theft  Auto 4 and movies such as Warner
Brothers’ The Dark Knight (which grossed $158.3 million in its first three days and is one of
the greatest opening box office successes in movie history) and James Cameron’s Avatar
(which netted $352,000,000 in its first 17 days in the U.S.) (Johnson 2009 and Gray 2010).
Thus, the programmers of Call of Duty have become important actors in the “marketplace
of ideas” about U.S. soldiers and the war of terror. In the sections below, many examples
highlight how the series (re)writes the ideology of militarism.
 
3. The (Re)Writing of Militarism in Call of Duty 
3.1. A Tabloid Imaginary of Post-9/11 Geopolitics 
We’ve got a civil war in Russia […] and 15,000 nukes at
stake
Gaz, British Special Air Service Veteran in Call of
Duty 4: Modern Warfare
What the hell are we gonna do now, man? 
Russians got us outnumbered, shit’s falling from
the sky. 
We’re screwed, man! We’re totally...
Corporal Dunn, United States Army Ranger in Call
of Duty: Modern Warfare 2
12 The first theme of U.S. militarism (re)written by Call of Duty is the idea that the U.S. faces
ruthless and evil enemies in the post-9/11 world, enemies it must absolutely destroy to
protect itself and the American people. Extending François Debrix’s analysis and building
a bridge between Critical Geopolitics and Game Studies, our argument here is that Call of
Duty feeds  Americans’  “fears,  anxieties,  and  insecurities”  by  promoting  a  “tabloid
imaginary” of  post-9/11 geopolitics (Debrix 2008,  5).  Building on John Agnew’s work,
Debrix defines geopolitics as the “study of the geographical representations, rhetoric and
practices that underpin world politics” (Agnew 2003, 5 quoted in Debrix 2008, 9). He also
argues that our leaders, intellectuals, thinkers — but also the popular culture products we
consume (for example, the Reader’s Digest) — provide us with “ready-made explanations,”
“cartographical  depictions” and “systems” of “visualizing the world we live in” (ibid.
9-12).  In  particular,  Debrix  uses  the  concept  of  “tabloid  geopolitics”  to  describe  the
system of visualizing the world that has pervaded the post-9/11 national security debate.
In Debrix’s words,
the discourse of tabloid geopolitics seeks to generate some meanings and truths in
(inter)national politics by sensationalizing and spectacularizing world politics at all
costs. Often recognizable because of the language and imagery of fear, danger, and
destruction  that  they  typically  mobilize,  geopolitical  “issues  and  problems”
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introduced  by  tabloid  geopolitical  agents  (media  networks  or  intellectuals  and
academics or statecraft) are depicted in such a fashion that it now appears to the
public that these so-called geopolitical problems can only be solved by means of
military violence. (Ibid. 14-15)
13 This “discourse of tabloid geopolitics” is overtly present in the Call of Duty series. In Call of
Duty  4:  Modern  Warfare ( MW),  U.S.  and  British  forces  face  Imran  Zakhaev,  a  Russian
Ultranationalist who is determined to bring his country back to the Soviet era.8 Zakhaev,
who  harbours  strong  feelings  of  hatred  toward  Western  countries,  argues  that  the
Russian government has “prostituted” his homeland to the U.S. and its allies.9 To topple
the Russian government,  he orchestrates a political crisis that leads to a civil  war in
Russia. His goal is clear: to take power of Russia and gain access to the entire Russian
nuclear weapons arsenal, which includes 15,000 nuclear warheads. Zakhaev knows that
the U.S. will take vigorous measures to thwart him, so he funds a coup in some unnamed
Arab country,  organized by his  ally  Khaled Al-Asad,  to  draw public  attention to  the
Middle East instead of Russia. Khaled Al-Asad, who is a military commander in this Arab
country, leads what he calls a “noble crusade” against his government, which “has been
colluding with the West.”10
14 When Al-Asad takes control of his homeland, the U.S. Marine Corps invades the country, a
move to which Al-Asad responds by detonating a Russian-made nuclear bomb that kills
large numbers of Marines. The U.S. and British governments soon discover that Russian
Ultranationalist Zakhaev’s plan was to divert the attention of both countries from the
Russian civil war, and they decide to dispatch troops from the Special Air Service and
United  States  Marine  Corps  Force  Reconnaissance  to  kill  Zakhaev  and  his  son.  In
response, Zakhaev threatens to launch ICBMs against eight U.S. cities: Baltimore, Boston,
Hartford,  Philadelphia,  New York,  Washington,  D.C.,  Richmond and Norfolk.  We soon
learn that such an attack could kill over 41 million U.S. citizens.11
15 Call  of  Duty:  Modern  Warfare  2  (MW2)  revolves  around  a  similar  “discourse  of  tabloid
geopolitics.” This time, however, the game depicts an even scarier world than the one
pictured in MW. MW2 is set five years after the conclusion of MW. In this game, Zakhaev’s
Ultranationalists (the same as in MW)  have seized control  of  Russia,  and the Russian
people have made Zakhaev, who was killed by the West in MW, a hero and martyr.12 MW2 
revolves around a new threat: Vladimir Makarov, one of Zakhaev’s former allies, who
begins a reign of terror against the U.S. and its allies by staging terrorist attacks such as
the bombing of a Swedish furniture store in St. Petersburg and of the offices of a U.S. oil
company in Baku, Azerbaijan. The game begins in Afghanistan, where U.S. Army Ranger
Private Allen takes part in an operation to retake an Afghan city from local militia13, but
we soon learn that  Private Allen must  join the CIA to lead a  secret  operation as  an
undercover agent inside Makarov’s organization in Russia. Thus, in the fourth campaign
mission of the game, called “No Russian”, the gamer impersonates undercover CIA agent
Allen (alias Alexei Borodin), working alongside Makarov and taking part in a gruesome
terrorist attack at Zakhaev International Airport in Moscow. The goal here is to open fire
on civilians at the airport (though the player can abstain and let Makarov and his three
colleagues do all the damage). At the end of the level, Makarov finally kills Allen after
finding out that he is a CIA agent. Makarov is then able to convince the Russian people
that  the  terrorist  attack  was  carried  out  by  military-trained  American  terrorists,  a
situation that leads to a surprise Russian invasion of America.
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16 The following scenes probably are the most significant examples of the ways in which Call
of Duty (re)writes post-9/11 fears, anxieties and insecurities. Indeed, in the “Wolverines!”
campaign level, the player impersonates Private James Ramirez, a member of the U.S.
Army Rangers,  who must help his team to repel  Russian attacks on U.S.  soil.  Taking
advantage  of  a  malfunction  in  NORAD’s  early-warning systems,  the  Russian  military
sneaks  in  via  the  East  Coast  undetected  and  launches  attacks  in  major  U.S.  cities.14
Specifically, “Wolverines!” takes place in an almost destroyed city in the state of Virginia.
As the player proceeds through the level, she can see the effects war would have on an
average American suburb. Houses and cars are on fire, enemy tanks roll on the streets,
the sky is filled with thick clouds of black smoke, U.S. soldiers are panic-stricken, and
dozens of gunshots and explosions can be heard simultaneously. Later in the game, MW2
invites players to imagine the impact war would have on a city such as Washington, D.C.
In a campaign level called “On their Own Accord,” the Russians have stormed most of the
buildings around the National Mall  and ruined the Washington Monument and other
objects of national pride. Here again, destruction, fire, smoke, gunshots and explosions
give the city an apocalyptic look.
17 As  one  can  see  from  such  plots,  MW  and  MW2 clearly  disseminate  and  reinforce  a
discourse/narrative that was constantly promoted by the Bush administration and other
foreign policy hawks after 9/11. This vision has been studied extensively, and there is no
need to remind the reader how often Bush and his advisors told Americans that the
post-9/11 world was a dangerous place. For example, in countless speeches that could
have been directly inspired by a game like Call of Duty (or a Tom Clancy book), Bush and
his team stressed that there were “thousands of terrorists” in the world who would not
hesitate to use weapons of mass destruction against the U.S. and kill millions of innocent
civilians (Jackson 2005). Other U.S. national security intellectuals15 gave credence to such
arguments, warning Americans that 9/11 was only the tip of the iceberg and that the
worst was still to come. For instance, in a 2005 article titled “Ten Years After,” Richard A.
Clarke “imagined the future history of the war on terror” and predicted a second wave of
Al-Qaeda attacks on America,  with suicide bombings in Las Vegas,  Florida,  California,
Texas and New Jersey (Clarke 2005). 
18 Just as Clarke does, Call of Duty (re)activates post-9/11 fears when it reminds Americans
that Arab terrorists such as Khaled Al-Asad could acquire nuclear weapons from “rogue
states” and use them against U.S. interests in the Middle East or elsewhere. In the same
way as  other  war  games  such as  America’s  Army,  it  portrays  Arabs  as  “savages”  and
“uncivilized warriors,”  thereby “providing ideological  sanction for  America’s  War  on
Terror”  and  military  intervention  in  the  Middle  East  (Leonard  2004,  5).  Equally
interesting  is  the  fact  that  Call  of  Duty echoes  not  only  Bush’s  discourse  of  tabloid
geopolitics but also Ronald Reagan’s vision of the Cold War. Indeed, MW and MW2 invite
gamers/Americans to see Russia as a “terrorist sponsor” and a “hotbed of terrorism,”
and, more importantly, as a state willing to relaunch the nuclear arms race with the U.S.,
regain its superpower status, and become an “Evil Empire” again. When playing Call of
Duty, Americans are thus encouraged to see Russia in the same way George Kennan saw it
when he wrote his famous Long Telegram in 1946 —as a “rival” with whom there is no
“possibility  of  a  permanent  happy coexistence” (Kennan 1947).  Therefore,  the games
“encourage divisiveness” (Sisler 2008, 204) and reinforce stereotypes about other cultures
by suggesting that Russians are cold-blooded individuals who can not be deterred from
trying to destroy the West and engaging in acts of mass destruction. In this sense, Call of
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Duty’s discourse of tabloid geopolitics is also consistent with the vision of International
Relations  theorists  such  as  “offensive  realist”  John  Mearsheimer,  who  argues  that
international politics is a ruthless and dangerous business driven by “revisionist” great
powers willing to shift the current balance of power in their favour (Mearsheimer 2001,
2).
 
3.2. Glorifying Military Power and Disseminating the Myth that State
Violence and Wars are Inevitable
19 In  addition  to  promoting  a  storyline  that  “could  be  pulled  from  today’s  headlines”
(Mastrapa  2009)  or  from  one  of  Mearsheimer’s  books,  Call  of  Duty also  promotes
militarism because  it  glorifies  military  power  and  disseminates  the  myth  that  state
violence and the wars waged by the U.S. abroad are unavoidable. Specifically, it conveys a
clear message about the role the U.S. should play in the world: just like former Secretary
of  Defense  Donald  Rumsfeld,  it  invites  gamers/Americans  to  believe  that  “the  best
defense and in some case the only defense” against national security threats is a “good
offense” (quoted in Flounders 2002). Consider the following excerpt from a speech given
by U.S. Army Lieutenant General Shepherd in MW2: “Learning to use the tools of modern
warfare is the difference between the prospering of your people, and utter destruction.”16
In other words, Call of Duty invites gamers/Americans to believe that a nation like the
United States must either develop a strong military or fade away. This idea has been
promoted  by  many  U.S.  national  security  intellectuals  since  9/11,  especially
neoconservative thinkers like Donald Kagan, Norman Podhoretz and other members of
neoconservative think-tanks such as  the Project  for  a  New American Century (PNAC).17
Indeed, Kagan and others have stressed the “need to increase defense spending” (PNAC
2007), arguing that there is “no substitute for hard military power” (Kagan 2010).
20 In  MW2,  Lieutenant  General  Shepherd  even  goes  a  step  further  in  echoing  the
neoconservative vision when he argues: “We [the U.S.] are the most powerful military
force in the history of man. Every fight is our fight, because what happens over here
matters over there. We don’t get to sit one out.”18 With such a discourse, Call of Duty’s
message is clear: it (re)writes the thesis of the American Manifest Destiny — the belief
that the U.S.  is a “sacred space providentially selected” to embark on a “mission” to
promote and defend democracy and American values throughout the world (Stephanson
1995). In the same line of argument, it also suggests that the U.S. has the duty and the
“overarching rights” (Paterson and Dalby 2006, 19) to go anywhere and to take part in
any  war  in  order  to  protect  its  hegemony.  Here  again,  Shepherd’s  speech  echoes
neoconservative  arguments:  just  like  Donald  Kagan,  it  “fetishizes  the  imperial
perspective” (Sisler 2008, 210) and tries to convince players that they should be proud of
the fact that the U.S. has “forces deployed in every theatre” (Kagan 2010).
21 Through the multiple campaign levels the gamer must complete in order to beat MW and 
MW2, at least three other aspects of the games reveal how they invite players to “love the
bomb” and to see state/military violence as an “inevitable”, “mandatory” and “normal”
— if not “banal” — step in resolving conflicts. First, the characters of Call of Duty never
consider the possibility of  relying on diplomacy to settle disputes with Arab military
leader Khaled Al-Asad or Russian Ultranationalists Imran Zakhaev and Vladimir Makarov.
On  the  contrary,  in  the  vision  of  world  politics  on  which  MW  and  MW2 are  based,
prospects for peace are dismissed as unrealistic. We are told that the true role of the state
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is to kill those who threaten U.S. and British national security. Here, Ian Bogost’s concept
of “procedural rhetoric” (described above) is relevant to explain how the rules of Call of
Duty are used to put the player in contact with the ideology of militarism. Given the linear
gameplay of MW and MW2,  the player is never allowed to adopt a different course of
action than the one imposed by the creators and the fixed sequence of challenges they
imagined. For instance, contrary to “non-linear”, “open world” or “sandbox” games such
as  Fallout  3,  Fable  2 or  Red  Dead  Redemption,  which  allow players  to  choose  between
different  paths  to  glory  and  to  make  moral  choices  between  good  and  evil  actions
(Schulzke 2009), MW and MW2 imprison the player in a web of restrictive rules that only
allow her to follow the path that was drawn by the programmers. As a result, the player is
never given a chance to negotiate with U.S. enemies; instead, she is invited to participate
in  “shock  and  awe-like”  military  interventions,  counterinsurgency  operations
reminiscent of the real U.S. wars in countries like Afghanistan, or secret operations and
assassination missions. As Matthew Thomson notes, in a digital war game like Call of Duty,
“the player must learn and internalize [the] rules of warfare and therefore learn how to
win according to the logic” of war (Thomson 2008, 46). In this respect, Call of Duty gives
players/Americans the opportunity to “be there” alongside computerized versions of U.S.
soldiers  and to  annihilate  “virtual  copies”  of  the  U.S.’s  “real”  enemies  in  the  world
(Ouellette 2008). Admittedly, MW and MW2 can probably serve as a release mechanism for
those who had to endure the vicious attacks of 9/11.19 However, the fact remains that the
games not only encourage maniacal revenge against other international actors but also
oblige  players  to  conform to a  violent  vision of  the warrior  ethos  and to  (virtually)
perform  the  (often)  brutal  and  gruesome  acts  concomitant  with  such  a  vision.  For
instance, in the Call of Duty environment, the player is soon told one basic fact about war:
shooting enemies in the head is preferable to shooting them in the arms, legs or body,
since it is more lethal. In the multiplayer modes of MW and MW2, players even earn more
points  for  “headshots.”  They  can  then  use  the  points  to  unlock  new  weapons  and
equipment (grenades,  flashbangs,  gun silencers,  etc.),  which,  according to the game’s
logic, is the surest way to become a better and more efficient and effective warrior. 
22 A second aspect showing how Call of Duty glorifies military power concerns the military
equipment that the player can use in MW and MW2. As Scott Lukas writes, an important
feature of  the contemporary digital  game is  that  “it  is,  often above all,  about  guns”
(Lukas 2010, 76). The Call of Duty series is no exception to the rule: it gives the player the
opportunity  to  arm  herself  with  most  weapons  U.S.  soldiers  can  use  in  “real”
contemporary wars. Among the most popular weapons in the games are the following:
the Colt M4A1 carbine, an assault rifle tracing its lineage back to the M16; the Winchester
Model  1200 Defender,  a  pump-action,  12-gauge shotgun;  the Raytheon and Lockheed
Martin FGM-Javelin anti-armor system; and the Cheytac LLC Intervention M-200 sniper
rifle. Here again, the goal of the creators of Call of Duty was to depict these weapons in the
most  “realistic”  and “authentic”  fashion,  a  situation that  illustrates  the relevance of
aforementioned arguments made by Jean Baudrillard about the blending of reality and
representation in the time of postmodernity. Thus, the programmers of MW and MW2
depict  weapons  in  detail  and  with  great  exactitude:  for  example,  shooting  the
Intervention M-200 “feels” different from shooting the Colt M4A1, and some weapons are
more accurate and/or more lethal than others. When asked about what their interaction
with digital games weapons constitute, many players say that using the weapons is a
“strategic decision” and a “means of achieving missions” (Lukas 2010, 87). Accordingly
and in line with Ian Bogost’s concept of “procedural rhetoric”, Call of Duty encourages
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players to identify the best military tools out there, to develop an attachment to certain
guns and to make these guns their “weapons of choice.” Often, the weapons used in MW 
and  MW2 are  the  very  same  weapons  the  Pentagon  and  defense  companies  such  as
Lockheed  Martin  praise  in  their  lobbying  effort  to  convince  elected  officials  in
Washington  to  invest  more  money  in  arms  development  and  production20.  In  the
multiplayer  modes of  MW  and  MW2,  players  are  rewarded  new (and  often  deadlier)
weapons, weapon attachments and/or bonus equipment as they advance and reach new
levels. Here, the player’s performance is measured with points, which are earned most
and  foremost  by  killing  opponents.  In  MW,  players  can  even  unlock  golden-skinned
versions of the guns used in the game. These guns are not more powerful than their
“normal” versions, but they are meant to look “sexier” to the player. The fact that they
actually do look like jewels invites players to see them as an ultimate reward and as
precious objects in the game. In short, Call of Duty trivializes violence and invites players
to  cherish  and  fetishize  weapons  by  applying  a  simple  equation:  killing  people  =
unlocking deadlier/“sexier” weapons = killing more people.
23 The third aspect highlighting how MW and MW2 glorify military power and the use of
force  is  the  fact  that  both  games  show  famous  pro-military  quotes  each  time  your
character dies. The quotes are from leading intellectuals, philosophers, military officials
or former leaders. They include Albert Einstein’s “So long as there are men, there will be
wars,” which stresses the dark side of human nature and the inevitability of international
conflict, General John J. Pershing’s “The deadliest weapon in the world is a Marine and his
rifle!,” and Condoleezza Rice’s “We’re in a world in which the possibility of terrorism,
married up with technology,  could make us  very,  very sorry that  we didn’t  act.”  Of
course, many other quotes, such as George Washington’s “My first wish is to see this
plague of  mankind,  war,  banished from the earth,” clearly have an anti-war or anti-
militarist bias. That being said, such quotes are given only limited discursive space and
importance in MW and MW2, since the game plots revolve around ideas that contradict
most arguments made by peace advocates.
 
3.3. A Sanitized Vision of war
24 Besides Call of Duty’s tendency to glorify the use of military force, the last major tenet of
the  ideology  of  militarism  that  we  observed  in  MW  and  MW2  is  the  fact  that  the
programmers of the games decided to refrain from showing the “real” consequences of
armed conflict. To be sure, MW and MW2 are violent games replete with scenes reminding
players that war is hell and that armed conflict often means violently taking the lives of
other human beings. However, as Roger Stahl points out, games like Call of Duty never tell
the  entire  truth  about  war:  “[W]hen  humans  are  hit  with  gunfire,  they  crumple
noiselessly to the ground. Sometimes a mist of blood escapes an invisible wound, but the
victims neither flail nor cry.” (Stahl 2006, 124). In other words, MW and MW2 never show
you dismembered bodies, “little girls with smashed up faces” (ibid. 126), people with their
skin burned or corpses lying on the ground, soaked in blood or massed together. You can
kill someone using a grenade or a knife, but you never see graphic details of the “real”
effects of an explosion on a human body or of a throat slit by a blade. 
25 Thus Call of Duty’s narrative gives credence to the arguments of those who praise the
“Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA). This revolution, it is often claimed, inaugurates a
new form of  warfare,  one  that  is  precise,  clinical  and  clean  (Metz  and  Kievit  1995;
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Rumsfeld 2002). Consistent with the RMA vision is Call of Duty’s tendency to keep silent
about “collateral damage,” or the adverse effects of war on civilian populations. To be
sure, some campaign levels in MW and MW2 remind you not to shoot civilians. But the
truth is that most cities and locations in the games are depicted without inhabitants and
the U.S. and British war effort is shown not to hurt civilians21. In fact, at least one level in
MW2 provides graphic details of the effects of war on civilians. In this level, called “No
Russian,” you are required to shoot at civilians deliberately. As mentioned earlier, this is
a part of the story where you play a CIA agent taking part in a terrorist attack at Zakhaev
International Airport in Moscow alongside Russian Ultranationalist Vladimir Makarov,
who is your enemy in the game. One game critic recounts his experience playing the
level:
As part of a group of four men with guns, you walk toward a security line full of
civilians at a Russian airport. And then you kill them. I’ll admit it — I pulled the
trigger. The game had instructed me to follow the lead of my fellow terrorists, and I
had been told that preserving my undercover status was important for the country
[…] As the travelers screamed and fled from the indiscriminate slaughter, I strolled
through the airport.  I  didn’t  fire my weapon anymore,  but I  watched the three
Russian terrorists kill. One of the men shot a passenger as he crawled along the
blood-streaked floor and pleaded for his life. And then I started shooting again. I
thought that a guard was going to kill me, so I went after him first. The bullets hit
his corpse — he was shot first by one of the other men — and it shuddered on the
ground […] The rules of play were clear: If you want to go forward, if you want to
keep playing, you have to kill these [individuals]. Do something awful with me, the
game asked. And I did. (Suellentrop 2009)
26 As one can see from the critic’s account, MW2 sometimes invites players to think about
the dark side of war and to make moral choices between good and evil paths (shooting
innocent civilians or not).  That being said, the fact that the only scenes showing the
slaughter of civilians are those in which Russians lead the way — instead of American or
British soldiers — can also be seen as an attempt to emphasize the idea that only “our
enemies” are capable of initiating such unjust and gruesome actions. For this reason, Call
of Duty seems to tell players that crimes against humanity and acts of mass murder do
happen in war but are most often performed by “them,” not “us.” As David Campbell
explains,  such  binary  oppositions  have  often  been  present  in  discourses  about  U.S.
foreign policy (Campbell 1998). Relying on examples such as the National Security Council
document  number  sixty-eight  of  1950  (NSC-68),  which  is  widely  seen  as  having
established the rationale for U.S. policy of containment of the Soviet Union after World
War II, Campbell shows how interpretations of danger and national security threats have
played a crucial role in the attempts of U.S. leaders to fix the contours of U.S. national
identity. For instance, in addition to observing that U.S. foreign policy texts are often
replete with references to the threatening, barbaric, sick, evil or dictatorial nature of
“others” like Saddam Hussein or the USSR, Campbell shows that the very same texts have
been used to describe the pacific, civilized and democratic U.S. society. In other words,
U.S. leaders or national security intellectuals have relied on these texts to construct a
moral hierarchy between “us” (the United States) and “them” (the Soviet Union). This is
exactly what the programmers of Call of Duty try to do when they depict (bad) Russians as
“sadistic  individuals  who  kill  civilians”  and  (good)  Americans  as  “compassionate
individuals who spare the lives of civilians.” 
27 In addition to depicting U.S. foreign adventures as benign, Call  of  Duty downplays the
effects of war on the boys. No matter which character you embody in MW or MW2, U.S.
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soldiers are depicted in the same way Hollywood often depicts them in war movies, i.e., as
invincible  individuals  “embarked  upon  life-and-death  situations”  (Boggs  and  Pollard
2007, 69) or, in other words, as men with Rambo-like strengths who can heal themselves
from practically any wound22. For instance, it is often easy for your enemy to shoot at
you, but it is equally easy for you to hide behind a wall and automatically regain energy.
In a similar vein,  MW and MW2 never show the graphic reality of  the death of  your
character, nor do they suggest that war has any psychological effect on the boys23. War is
shown as being safe, as having little consequence for the individuals who wage it, and as
being “high-tech, fun, and hip” (Halter 2006, xvii).
 
4. Conclusion 
28 The goal of this article was to show how a digital game such as Call of Duty can become “an
artefact that legitimizes modern militaries as a natural part of social and personal life”
(Flusty et al.  2008, 626). We have shown how MW and MW2 echoe and (re)write ideas
reflecting the militarist ideology that has often been (pre)dominant in the post-9/11 U.S.
national security debate. In particular, Call of Duty resonates with and reinforces a tabloid
imaginary of post-9/11 geopolitics when it tells players that “we” are constantly on the
brink of war with international actors such as Arab terrorists and Russia, who will not
hesitate to invade “our” countries and attack “us” with nuclear weapons. In keeping with
such a catastrophic and pessimistic vision of world politics, the idea that the U.S. and its
allies have to maintain a strong military is constantly (re)inscribed in MW and MW2, the
plots of which are based on an “all-pervasive rhetoric of warfare” (Leonard 2004, 6) that
glorifies the U.S. war machine, downplays the monstrosities of war and encourage our
myopia by depicting a sanitized vision of armed conflict.
29 Granted,  it  would  be  going  too  far  to  argue  that  those  who  play  Call  of  Duty will
automatically embrace militarism and the values embedded in the games. Though the
1999  Columbine  High  School  massacre  has  led  many  academics,  media,  parents  and
government officials  to argue that  digital  game use among children has “deleterious
consequences, ranging from aggressiveness and violence” (Souri 2007, 542), video game
experts such as Joe Bryce and Jason Rutter show that the research trying to prove that
digital games are a catalyst for violence is “inconclusive and often contradictory” (Bryce
and Rutter 2006, 218). Matthew Thomson agrees with Bryce and Rutter when he writes,
“any suggestion that computer games influence public understandings of warfare must
concede that the process of audience reception is far more complex than the passive
acceptance  of  meaning  that  the  ‘hypodermic  needle’  model  of  media  effects  once
suggested,  and  that  the  interaction  between  game  and  player  involves  processes  of
encoding and decoding, as well as resistance and rejection” (Thomson 2008, 20-21). 
30 In her study of the meanings players create about their engagement with war digital
games,  Nina  B.  Huntemann  gathered  data  in  multiple  focus  group  and  participant
observation sessions with a sample size of 26 male players ranging from 18 to 36 years of
age and observed the following:  “The players I  interviewed retained their skepticism
about current military actions, questioning the motives, strategies, purported goals, and
likely success of U.S. foreign policy and military intervention” (Huntemann 2010, 232).
Having discussed the potential  effect of  games on understandings and perceptions of
warfare with dozens of MW and MW2 players, we also observed that there are probably as
many players who are seduced by the vision of the military portrayed in Call of Duty as
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there are players who are repulsed by it. For instance, one player from the Middle East
confided that he loves the game even though he rejects militarism, U.S. interventions in
Iraq and Afghanistan, and state violence in general. Thus, as the literature on audience
reception  of  digital  games  and  interviews  with  players  show,  Call  of  Duty will  not
necessarily make you want to join the military or support the wars waged by you country.
31 That being said, we have showed in this article that MW and MW2 certainly has – at least –
the potential to make you “love the bomb” and embrace militarism. This is why we think
David Leonard is  right  to  argue that  educators,  scholars  and — most  importantly  —
players must “think about ways to use video games as means to teach, destabilize, and
elucidate the manner in which games employ and deploy racial, gendered, and national
meaning, often reinforcing dominant ideas and the status quo” (Leonard 2004, 1). In other
words,  playing Call  of  Duty primarily because it  is  fun — and millions of  players can
confirm it is! — is probably not wrong in itself. But playing it for the sake of “making the
familiar strange,” and “disrupting the taking for granted that blinkers our thinking and
reading” (Costigliola 2004, 280) should be encouraged. Indeed, it can help us to critically
analyse  the  moral  implications  of  the  (hyper)militarization  of  our  everyday  lives,
denounce the trivialization of (state) violence, and raise the hard questions that might
prompt our leaders to make the world safer for peace,  international reciprocity,  and
social and international justice.
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NOTES
1. Our definition of “militarism” follows Cynthia Enloe’s analysis. Enloe (2000) defines it as an
ideology  that  frames  military  force  as  a  necessary  resolver  of  conflict.  This  definition  is
consistent with Albert T. Lauterbach’s analysis. According to Lauterbach (1944), “militarism” is
an “attitude toward public affairs which conceives war and the preparation of war as the chief
instruments of foreign policy.”
2. On Hollywood war movies and the war in Iraq, see Gagnon 2009.
3. As  Marcus  Power  (2007)  and  Aphra  Kerr  (2006)  point  out,  the  term  “digital  games”  is
preferable to “video games” since it refers to the entire field and embraces arcade, computer,
console and mobile games in all their diversity.
4. The goal of this approach is to understand the meanings constructed through games. See Zagal
2008, 21-22. Thus, in the debate over how digital games should be studied, or the so-called debate
between “narratologists” and “ludologists”, we tend to prefer the former approach and think
that  one  can  rely  on  theories  from  existing  disciplines  (International  Relations,  American
Studies,  Film  Studies,  etc.)  to  treat  digital  games  as  “stories”,  “representation”,  “texts”  or
“discourses”  disseminating specific  values,  ideologies  and myths.  That  being said,  we do not
totally reject the “ludologist” perspective, developed by scholars who argue that “game analysis
should focus on the structural features of gameplay – the rules and goals – along with its unique
features  –  interactivity,  simulation,  configuration,  and  the  manipulable  elements  of  games”
(Thomson 2007). As will be argued below, some rules of Call of Duty greatly contribute to the
(re)writing of militarism (for instance, the rule that invites players to perform “headshots” when
killing opponents, since it rewards more points than a shot to the body, arms or legs). However,
it is a fact that this article focuses more on the narrative of Call of Duty than on its structural
features  of  gameplay.  For  more  information on the  “Narratology  vs.  Ludology debate”,  read
Bogost 2006; Juul 2001; and Simons 2007. Narratologists include Murray 1997 while scholars such
as Juul 2001 and Aarseth 2004 have promoted “Ludology.”
5. Leonard 2004 and Li 2004 are good examples of this.
6. Grant Tavinor (2009) and Matthew Thomas Payne (2010) provided some of the rare analyses of
MW. However, they do not address the case of MW2. Joel Penney (2010) also focused on Call of
Duty. However, he studies the installments in the series that are set in World War II.
7. This is Frank Costigliola’s interpretation of Foucault’s definition of a discourse. See Costigliola
2004, 289. 
8. For more information about the plot of MW, see a website called “Call of Duty: No One Edits
Alone” at http://callofduty.wikia.com/wiki/Call_of_Duty_4:_Modern_Warfare
9. See Zakhaev’s speech during the cutscene before the “Ultimatum” campaign level in MW.
10. See Khaled Al-Asad’s speech during the “The Coup” campaign level in MW.
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11. Play the “All in” campaign level in MW.
12. For more information about the plot of MW2, see a website called “Call of Duty: No One Edits
Alone” at http://callofduty.wikia.com/wiki/Call_of_Duty:_Modern_Warfare_2
13. Play the “Team Player” campaign level in MW2.
14. For more information about the plot of the “Wolverines!” campaign level, play it or see a
website  called  “Call  of  Duty:  No  One  Edits  Alone” at  http://callofduty.wikia.com/wiki/
Wolverines!
15. Our definition of “U.S. national security intellectuals” is similar to David Grondin’s concept of
“national  security  governmental  regime.”  He  defines  the  regime  as  “all  agents  of  the  U.S.
government  and  of  the  private  sector  (particularly  think-tanks  and  unofficial  advisers)  who
participate, to a certain extent, in the national security debate and who, incidentally, influence
the ways Americans think about national security, threats and the role the U.S. should play in the
world” (Grondin 2010, 93, note 1).
16. Play the “Team Player” campaign level in MW2 to hear the speech.
17. To learn more about the neoconservative ideology, read Kristol 2004; Marshall 2003; Kagan
1998; Kristol and Kagan 2004. For an introduction to neoconservatism, read Gagnon and Mascotto
2010.
18. Play the “Team Player” campaign level in MW2 to hear the speech.
19. As Marcus Power (2007) writes,  “[Digital  war games] offer the possibility of  getting back
control, of overcoming fear […] [Y]ou can pretend you have some sense of agency, some control,
or at the very least some part in trying to make the world a better place.” 
20. According  to  the  Center  for  Responsive  Politics,  Lockheed  Martin’s  total  lobbying
expenditures accounted for more than $15 million dollars in 2008 and almost $14 million dollars
in 2009. For more information, see this website : www.opensecrets.org 
21. Vit Sisler observes that this aspect of MW and MW2 is common in many western war games.
22. David Leonard (2004, 5) makes a similar observation about the depiction of U.S. soldiers in the
game Conflict : Desert Storm.
23. For similar arguments, read Power 2007 and Stahl 2006.
ABSTRACTS
The goal of this article is to discuss how digital war games such as the Call of Duty series elicit
consent for the U.S. military, militarism and the wars waged by the U.S. and its allies abroad.
Building  bridges  between  the  humanities  approach  to  Game  Studies,  American  Studies,
International Relations and Critical Geopolitics, we start from the assumption that digital games
are  more  than  “kid’s  games”;  they  are  sophisticated  vehicles  inhabiting  and  disseminating
specific ideologies (Leonard 2004). Accordingly, our goal is to conduct a content analysis (Sisler
2008) of Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare and Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 to show how these games
contain  images  and  narratives  that  (1)  resonate  with  and  reinforce  a  tabloid  imaginary  of
post-9/11 geopolitics (Debrix 2008); (2) glorify military power and elicit consent for the idea that
state violence and wars are inevitable; and (3) encourage our myopia by depicting a sanitized
vision of war and downplaying the negative consequences of state violence (Stahl 2006).  The
conclusion invites players to think about ways to criticize the way games like Call of Duty employ
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and deploy values that (re)write the militarist mindset that has often pervaded the post-9/11 U.S.
national security debate.
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